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 ‘DESPERATELY MORTAL’: EXCLUSION IN 
SHAKESPEARE’S LEGAL PLAYS 
 
 
JOHN R MORSS
*
 
 
 
[Shakespeare’s most explicitly ‘legal’ plays are The Merchant 
of Venice and Measure for Measure. Both examine the 
interaction between human desire on one hand and the law on 
the other. In both plays laws cuts through the social 
hierarchies, either neutralising or exaggerating them. Key 
characters find their exclusion nullified by the law, and then 
discover inclusion is far worse than exclusion.]. 
 
 
I PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION: ‘EXCLUSION BY INCLUSION’ 
 
In the course of articulating a phenomenological account of legal discourse, 
William Conklin examines what he calls the ‘enclos[ing]’ of the experiences 
of a plaintiff by the discourse of judges, in an alleged discrimination case.
1
 
The case concerned a Ms Bhadauria who despite making many applications 
for jobs for which she was well qualified did not get offered any interviews. 
Conklin claims that “the harm of denying Ms Bhadauria a job interview only 
worsened once she was immersed into the legal discourse.” Legal 
professionals, Conklin reports, used legal terminology and short forms of 
case names such that “the knowers’ language” became “more obfuscating”. 
Thus “[a] new type of suffering displaced Ms Bhadauria’s experience of 
receiving her rejection letters.”  
 
                                                 
* Associate Head, Deakin University Law School, Burwood, Victoria. I would like to 
express my thanks to Michael Meehan for encouraging my ventures. . 
1
 William Conklin, The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse (1998). It 
should be stressed that Conklin also problematises the notion of ‘case’ (at 42) as 
another trope of exclusion: “Mrs Bhadauria was just that – a case” (at 43); similarly 
‘plaintiff.’ 
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As a consequence of their “assimilation of Ms Bhadauria’s felt experience of 
pain into the secondary authoritative discourse,” Conklin notes, the judges 
occluded that experience and did not adequately (in fact did not even 
remotely) recognise it. Ms Bhadauria’s experience was “excluded” by being 
“included” or so Conklin’s sub-heading (quoted in my own, above) asserts. 
Thus: 
 
When a knower claims to ‘know’ the facts of a non-knower, the knower 
intuitively takes the non-knower to be a living subject. But the knower 
does so by analogizing about the non-knower from experiences which the 
knower has had in the past. The non-knower is analogized inside the 
knower’s constituting consciousness.
2
 
 
Conklin’s phenomenological approach seeks to apply a Gadamerian 
perspective to the processes by which the law responds to individual needs. 
Thus he emphasises the lack of common ground between the judicial system 
and the so-called ‘plaintiff,’ that is to say, the absence of shared ‘fore-
structures of understanding’ or in Gadamer’s term of art, of ‘prejudice.’ The 
appropriate remediation according to Conklin is to modify Gadamer with a 
little Bakhtin. Thus: 
 
The justice of a dialogic relation dwells in the murmur of multiple 
embodied meanings... The knower must recognize the language of a non-
knower in order to carry on a dialogue... Dialogue helps to recover the 
saying of what was said.
3
 
 
Justice for Conklin “lies in the heterology of voices embedded in the silent 
intertext between dialogic partners.”
4
 In this condition there is no inclusion 
and hence no exclusion, only a reaching-out to an unknown shared arena. Yet 
even here there is difference: “the justice of the language of the non-knower 
… is concrete and context-specific”
5
 in contrast to the “idealism of the justice 
of the secondary genre [of legal discourse].” The particular, contrastive 
descriptions Conklin gives of these two modes is familiar but this should not 
distract us from his general point, that the shared space of justice is not 
homogeneous. Thus when we see that exclusion is caused by inclusion, and 
that we must therefore strive to exclude inclusion, we are driven to examine 
the contestation of discourses: a dramatic space, a space of performance. 
                                                 
2
 Id. at 205, emphases in original. 
3
 Id. at 240-1, emphases in original. 
4
 Id. at 244. 
5
 Loc cit. 
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Moreover as Conklin notes, even if one accepts such an analysis as 
representing what is not merely conceivable but also desirable, the question 
remains “How does one institutionalize such a dialogic relationship?”
6
 The 
same question arises from a Levinasian perspective:
7
 how can I prioritise the 
face of the other in such a way that this absolute inclusion does not occlude 
the faceless ones? This is a question about the organisation of justice – its 
social structuration – that is to say, ‘the law.’ It is a question about the scene 
of law. Scene One is set in Venice; Scene Two in Vienna. 
  
 
II EXCLUSION IN THE BARD 
 
The two plays selected for principle discussion here are the two plays of 
Shakespeare identified by  commentators
8
 as the most explicitly ‘legal’ in 
subject-matter. The Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure both deal 
with the application of law and with conflicts between different ways of 
apperceiving and implementing law. Both plays expressly contextualise law 
within the dynamics of human desire and of social institutions – Critical 
Legal Studies avant la lettre as it were.  
 
Both examine the aspiration for principles of justice that might transcend the 
everyday world of commerce and of lust, and both cast this aspiration in an 
ironic light. The rhetorical aspects of law are spotlighted in both plays, with 
the highest flights of poetic fancy being reserved for the representation of 
advocacy (“the quality of mercy is not strained…”) rather than for soliloquy. 
Law throughout these plays is performative, a matter of ‘how to do things 
with words,’ a contested form of social practice that cross-cuts the more 
obvious hierarchies of power like an interfering wave, sometimes neutralising 
them and sometimes amplifying them to horrifying extents. Law is a 
supplement to normal human activity. 
 
Neither play is easy to categorise in terms of the traditional troika of 
Shakespearean genres (comedy, tragedy, history), both requiring to be termed 
                                                 
6
 Id. at 245; see Tony Waters, Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan (2000). 
7
 Conklin, supra note 2, at 45; also see John R Morss, Saving Human Rights from Its 
Friends: The imaginary ethics of Costas Douzinas, 27 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 889 
(2003). 
8
 Daniel Kornstein, Kill All the Lawyers: Shakespeare’s Legal Appeal 63 (1994);  the 
selection coincides with the present author’s own acting experience in The Merchant 
of Venice Dir. Donald Hope-Evans, with Lyndon Hood as Shylock, 2000; and in 
Measure for Measure Dir. Lyndon Hood with Andrew Patterson as Angelo, 2001; 
both at the Globe Theatre, Dunedin, New Zealand. 
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‘comedies’ because of their (if incomplete) resolutions while both seem to 
resist such categorisation. Measure for Measure has been long classified as a 
‘problem play’ and as the only play in common between numerous critics’ 
versions of this useful category
9
 it perhaps deserves to be called the problem 
play. In travelling the road from The Merchant to Measure for Measure 
Shakespeare may have progressed from answer to problem. Both plays centre 
on the actions of a villain
10
 who attempts but fails to harness the law as he 
finds it to be, for his personal agenda (as plaintiff in Shylock’s case, as 
executive in the case of Measure for Measure’s Angelo). Neither Shylock nor 
Angelo is villainous enough to see himself and to perform himself as above 
the law or (which is the same thing) as a law-maker, as do the grand villains 
like Richard III and King Lear’s Edmund. Such grand villains treat law with 
disdain, but this form of burlesque is not available to the bawds of Vienna or 
to the only slightly less grubby merchant class of Venice.  
 
Indeed the law-makers in both plays (dukes both) are minor characters in the 
drama. Both Shylock and Angelo are creatures of the law, extruded by it in 
its mock-Venetian and mock-Viennese manifestations, respectively. Neither 
seeks to change the law, merely to serve it as it serves them. And both are 
ultimately the fools of the law, destroyed by it in the form of advocacy (The 
Merchant) or in the form of legislation (Measure for Measure). Both plays 
end with the “conversion of the villain.”
11
 In a variety of ways both Shylock 
and Angelo thus find themselves at last included in the law and find that this 
is far worse than exclusion ever was. In doing so, they illustrate for us some 
of the ways in which law works, and some characteristics of its peculiar 
mixture of exclusions and inclusions.  Thus it seems wide of the mark to 
claim that “equity jurisprudence is painted … in rosy hues” in these two 
plays, as claimed by Posner.
12
 The role of equity-like discretion in The 
                                                 
9
 Among six lists, All’s Well That Ends Well and Troilus and Cressida come joint 
second with five mentions each; other titles include Hamlet with two nominations: 
see William Lawrence, Shakespeare’s Problem Comedies (1969); Ernest Schanzer, 
The Problem Plays of Shakespeare (1963); Vivian Thomas, The Moral Universe of 
Shakespeare’s Problem Plays (1987); E. M. W. Tillyard, Shakespeare’s Problem 
Plays (1965); Peter Ure, The Problem Plays (1961) 7 (Boas’ and Ure’s lists). The 
Merchant of Venice appears in none of these lists; it is however identified as a 
problem play by W. H. Auden, Brothers and Others (from The Dyer’s Hand [1963]) 
in Shakespeare: The Merchant of Venice: A Casebook 224-240, 229 (John Wilders 
ed., 1969). 
10
 While Shylock is no Richard III, attempts to read him as a sympathetic figure seem 
strained: Harold Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human 171 (1999). 
11
 The phrase is used of Measure for Measure by Lawrence, supra note 10, at 114. 
12
 Richard Posner, Law and Literature 143 (rev ed, 1998). 
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Merchant is contaminated by the treatment of Shylock by the court, and it is 
hard to find anything even resembling equity in Measure for Measure. As 
Thomas comments in relation to the latter, “Shakespeare is not making some 
glib point about striking a careful balance between rigour and compassion.”
13
 
 
 
III THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 
 
The Merchant of Venice, probably dated circa 1596-7
14
 is a play about 
exclusion in several ways. While Shylock’s exclusion is patent, he is at the 
end included (forcibly) into Christian society when his life is spared only on 
the condition of conversion. In Belmont, the “richly left” Portia manipulates 
her deceased father’s will, with its riddle of the three caskets, so as to hitch 
up with the attractive, irresponsible Bassanio, for no other reasons it appears 
than that he is attractive and irresponsible, and above all not foreign. Portia 
peremptorily excludes suitors from other ethnic or national backgrounds in a 
still crowd-pleasing stand-up routine, a parody of the institutionalised 
discrimination that characterises Venice.  
 
Later Portia manipulates the Law of Venice in order to save the life of 
Bassanio’s friend, whose predicament is one assumes distracting him and 
thus preventing them (Portia and Bassanio) from consummating their 
nuptials; but in terms of Portia’s motivation, the extended courtroom scene is 
a sideshow. Shylock leaves the stage in Act IV Scene i, excluded by the brat-
pack which takes over the stage for the remaining time. In terms of the 
structure of the play what is noticeable is the marginal role played by The 
Merchant himself, Antonio. If it be accepted that play is a comedy, and that 
the joyful Christian pairings at the end (Portia: Bassanio, Nerissa: Gratiano 
and Jessica: Lorenzo) are integral to the structure, then Antonio’s solitude 
cannot be explained merely by the absence of a convenient and unattached 
female character. Antonio starts alone and ends alone. Antonio lends money 
freely but has no wife; his lending of money represents a kind of celibacy or 
impotence since no breeding results from the activity. He is an idle but a 
squeaky wheel. By lending money to his friends (fellow-Christians) without 
interest, Antonio is repudiating the role of money as currency: denying its 
‘natural’ breeding role in a mercantile state that relies on trade. 
 
                                                 
13
 Thomas, supra  note 10, at 176. 
14
 Bloom, supra  note 11, at 172. 
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Certainly for Auden, Antonio’s intense (and to that extent not fully 
reciprocated) attachment to Bassanio is suggestive.
15
 Such “inordinate 
affection” is for Auden to be linked with Antonio’s willingness to stand 
surety for his friend, a practice condemned in Shakespeare’s time (as Auden 
demonstrates) by Lord Burghley, Sir Walter Raleigh and Martin Luther. In 
doing so Antonio, like Shylock, risks everything, whereas Bassanio patently 
does not even though the third casket’s motto stated that “Who chooseth me, 
must give and hazard all he hath.” It is Antonio and Shylock who are 
excluded from the happy land of Belmont (Antonio by remaining single).
16
 
Both have voluntarily adopted courses of action, consistent with their 
respective natures, that make this inevitable. Neither of them belong with 
“the Christian husbands” while Bassanio clearly does. 
 
Shylock, against his nature as it were, offers an interest-free loan to Antonio 
– that is he offers the kind of loan made between Christian friends in Venice. 
Shylock tempts providence by doing so, and is accordingly punished (by 
fate). It may be that Shylock is to be seen as punished for seeking to change 
his nature. The anti-Semitism of the play
17
 (notwithstanding the occasional 
loopholes
 
 provided to the viewer like so many blank cartridges at a firing 
squad) can hardly be doubted. In lending without interest – even though this 
is accompanied by the ‘merry jest’ of Antonio’s body-bond – Shylock is thus 
aping the Christian. His assigned role is to charge interest and to be spurned 
for charging interest. More generally Shylock has surely been aping the 
Christian in keeping a Christian as his house-servant (the younger Gobbo) 
and as it turns out at the end, he has been aping the Christian husbands in 
symbolising his betrothal vows with a ring (the ring exchanged for a monkey 
by his runaway daughter). It seems that Shylock’s humanity is treated by the 
unfolding play as a mockery and a joke, his communalities with the gentiles 
of Venice being stripped away from him one by one. The fact that Shylock is 
articulate and even witty merely heightens the effect and thereby intensifies 
the humiliation. 
 
Above all, in The Merchant nobody refuses to play along with the charade. 
All of Portia’s suitors accept her rules. Shylock accepts the rules of the 
Venice courtroom (he does not reject its jurisdiction, and nor does he wheel 
in the Jewish lawyers). Antonio accepts the jurisdiction of the court, perhaps 
because he voluntarily rendered vulnerable his body and perhaps even with a 
hint of masochism. In its characters’ dogged commitment to the narrative 
                                                 
15
 Auden, supra  note 10, at 236. 
16
 Id. at 239-240. 
17
 Bloom, supra  note 11, at 171. 
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form in which they find themselves ––excluding any realisation of 
alternatives –– The Merchant is farce-like. This is the case as well in the 
more general shallowness of characterisation in the play: the characters’ 
motivation is no more and no less than the objectives the characters pursue 
when in our sight. What you see is what you get, as in law:  
 
It is not a valid criticism of the trial of a child that “the real child was not 
revealed” any more than it would be a valid criticism to say in the trial of 
an adult, “the real adult was not revealed.”
18
  
 
Law is not about interiors. As a model of the law, The Merchant of Venice is 
thus spot-on. 
 
 
IV MEASURE FOR MEASURE 
 
As well as being Shakespeare’s ‘other’ law-play, Measure for Measure seems 
to represent a re-appraisal of law’s relationships with human desire as earlier 
outlined in The Merchant. In the former play the procedure of the law is 
appropriated by a clever woman in order to save her betrothed from 
embarrassment. The law of Venice is treated in that play as objective and 
unchangeable, independent of the wishes and predilections of its subjects. 
Although Venice’s international dealings are mentioned, as requiring the 
predictability of commerce and hence the honouring of contracts, there is no 
Venetian Michael Kirby to propose that International Law be called upon to 
clarify the municipal obscurities. In the latter play however, laws are found to 
be not only interpreted and implemented by people, but also made by people. 
This knowledge proves to be not comforting but terrifying.  
 
In Measure for Measure, thought to have been written in approximately 
1604,
19
 and thus almost definitely later than The Merchant, we are given a 
bawd’s-eye view of law, and the bawd numbers advocates and government 
officials among his clients. The Duke of Vienna spies on and manipulates his 
subjects for all the world as in the reality television shows so characteristic of 
our recent fin de siecle.
20
 He even takes confessions,
21
 disguised as a friar. In 
                                                 
18
 John R. Morss, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Nevertheless Dead: The 
hypothetical adolescence of Prince Hamlet and the contested remorselessness of 
young offenders, 1 University N.E.L.J. 187, 197 (2004).  
19
 Bloom, supra  note 11, at 358. 
20
 Splendidly satirised by Ben Elton, Dead Famous (2002). 
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what one might term the ‘pre-credit sequence’, the Duke purports to leave his 
city’s governance in the untested hands of his deputy Angelo who 
immediately proceeds to enforce the Duke’s laws, hitherto unobserved ‘dead 
letters.’
22
 In particular, the harsh proscription of premarital intercourse is 
implemented in regard to young Claudio and his betrothed Juliet. Further 
abusing his power by offering Claudio’s sister, the nun-to-be Isabella, the 
option of saving her brother’s life at the cost of her own dishonour, Angelo is 
tricked into bedding his own abandoned fiancé Mariana and hence 
committing the exact offence for which he has convicted Claudio.  
 
These machinations are facilitated by the disguised Duke who, finally 
revealed, proclaims a series of marriages: Juliet and Claudio, Mariana and 
Angelo, Kate Keepdown (a prostititute) and Lucio (a bawd) and last but not 
least, a possibly surprised Isabella and himself. Isabella’s forced inclusion 
into the bourgeois marriage stakes by the Duke can be compared with the 
forced assimilation of Shylock; the effect on her self-image and on her life’s 
trajectory is as traumatic one might think. The matchmaking finale recalls 
The Merchant. On this occasion the most notable character left out of the 
couplings is the truculent Barnardine, recalcitrant murderer whose blunt 
refusal to acquiesce in his own execution offers a sane commentary on the 
grotesque sophistries of the (disguised) Duke.
23
  
 
Barnardine seems to be at the moral core of the play (if this “masterpiece of 
nihilism”
24
 can be said to have one). Isabella’s insistence on justice and 
chastity have suggested fanaticism
25
 (and perhaps worse, “legalism”
26
) 
whereas Barnardine’s disobedience is the acme of level-headedness. 
Barnardine simply refuses to contribute his body to the punitive whims of the 
penal system in which he finds himself, in a Vienna that is reminiscent of 
Shakespeare’s London in many respects although “emphatically Roman 
Catholic”.
27
 In this way, rather like Lewis Carroll’s Alice refusing to 
collaborate with the playing cards’ tribunal, Barnardine’s disavowal – his 
self-exclusion as one might say – threatens to subvert the whole polity. In 
remaining uncoupled at the end he recalls Antonio, like him a character 
                                                                                                                    
21
 Confessional addresses to camera by inmates of ‘Big Brother’ facilities are 
characteristic of the genre: Id. 
22
 Kornstein, supra note 9, at 46. 
23
 Bloom, supra  note 11, at 369. 
24
 Id. at 363. 
25
 Posner, supra note 13, at 115. 
26
 And “puritanism,” Schanzer, supra note 10, at 104. 
27
 Posner, supra note 23, at 116. 
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threatened with death under guise of law and like him also something of a 
hapless Hitchcockian hero. For both Antonio and Barnardine are drawn into 
other people’s machinations somewhat by happenstance: if Antonio had been 
on holiday then Bassanio would surely have battened on the next merchant 
on the Rialto (we even see them disporting), and Barnardine is similarly in 
the wrong place at the wrong time. The difference between the characters is 
how they respond to their narrative predicament. Antonio like Kafka’s Joseph 
K, meekly submits; Barnardine raises an expressive finger. 
 
Barnardine commits himself to the circulation of fluids through his body 
instead of the circulation of his body through the legal system of Vienna. 
Barnardine’s body was in any event wanted only for its head which would 
have sufficiently resembled that of Claudio for the latter’s execution to be 
simulated; the remainder of his deceased corpse would presumably have been 
discarded. With Barnardine’s refusal to cooperate, another dead head is 
readily obtained in this farcical adumbration of Blackadder. Men’s heads 
circulate around the Viennese prison, just as presumably women’s bodies 
circulate around the Viennese brothels so that the twin institutions of 
‘jailhouse and whorehouse’
28
 come to represent the metropolis. The bawd 
Pompey compares the ‘merriest’ usury (fornication) with the ‘worser’ usury 
of money-lending, commenting that the former is prohibited and the latter 
allowed.
29
 In Measure for Measure therefore exclusion is turned inside-out: 
just as the Duke absents himself from Vienna, mimicking a banishment, so 
does Barnardine absent himself from the forensic machine. The law may, he 
is saying, proceed in his absence. 
 
Law includes the plea in mitigation
30
 –– a plea that presupposes the justice of 
a recent conviction. In a climactic scene, mitigation is sought from Angelo by 
Isabella on her brother’s behalf.
31
 Notably Isabella requires egging-on (by the 
bawd Lucio) to present her plea, a dynamic that presents a stark contrast with 
Portia’s confident autonomy.
32
 As well as its other dramatic dimensions, this 
suggests an extra level of mediation and hence of the deliberate deployment 
of rhetoric by Isabella. Only now, perhaps, as she performs the plea to two 
                                                 
28
 Melvin Seiden, Measure for Measure: Casuistry and Artistry 85 (1990). 
29
 Thomas, supra note 10, at 186 [qv Measure for Measure III ii 6-8]. 
30
 Richard Edney, Literary Concepts and the Plea in Mitigation, 9 Deakin L.Rev. 183 
(2004) 
31
 Ernest Schanzer, Justice and King James in Measure for Measure, in Shakespeare: 
Measure for Measure: A Selection of Critical Essays 233-241, 234  (C K Stead ed., 
1971).  
32
 Thomas, supra note 10, at 180. 
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quite different listeners as well as to herself, is Isabella’s powerful intellect 
fully engaged. For Bate, the role of Isabella is radically ambiguous – its 
internal inconsistencies to be grasped only through the seventh (and most 
esoteric) of Empson’s seven types of ambiguity.
33
 Of course, Measure for 
Measure is “singularly apt to provoke its critics to excess.”
34
 But it is hard 
not to see Isabella as a Portia stripped of privilege and of self-certainty, 
venturing way beyond the comfort zone of convention within which the fair 
maid of Belmont is so careful to remain.  
 
 
V ‘ANOTHER LANGUAGE ALTOGETHER’: 
THE LAW OF THE STRANGER 
 
Exclusion became a major literary trope in the twentieth century with the 
writings of Kafka and Camus among others. Exclusion as a topic was not 
however an invention of this recent era: the role of ‘the stranger’ was central 
to the works of Shakespeare at least as discerned by Leslie Fiedler.
35
 
Exclusion and marginalisation are not infrequent themes throughout the 
plays; Shylock has the Puritan’s antipathy to music
 
and hence is brother to 
the Puritan Malvolio of Twelfth Night. Like Antonio, and like Shylock 
himself (and indeed like Antonio’s namesake in Malvolio’s play), Malvolio 
is left solitary at the end of his play, detached from the celebratory in-crowd.  
 
It is these solitary figures to whom law seems most salient in Shakespeare’s 
world: the well-ordered microcosm characterised by the network of marriage 
relationship seems not to be in need of it. Rather like the modern family, in 
which disputes or tensions are seen as matter for therapy before matter for 
legal intervention, Shakespeare’s couple-founded communities are it seems 
self-regulating as a consequence of having got the basics right. Such self-
regulation may conceal mere patriarchy, yet consent and collaboration (as in 
The Taming of the Shrew) play an essential part in the subservience of young 
people, women and the labouring classes in Shakespeare’s worldview as 
dramatist: once again, exclusion through inclusion. 
 
Exclusion is perhaps complicit in our contemporary sense of Shakespeare 
whether or not this was the case in Elizabethan times; Shakespeare as 
literature is paradigmatically canonical.
36
  There seems no reason to think that 
                                                 
33
 Jonathan Bate, The Genius of Shakespeare 316 (1997). 
34
 Tillyard, supra note 10, at 118. 
35
 Leslie Fiedler, The Stranger in Shakespeare (1974). 
36
 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction 187 (2d ed. 1996). 
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Shakespeare-and-Law
37
 as a sub-discipline of Law and Literature
38
 amends 
this exclusionary tendency. Shakespeare’s use of legal terminology is much 
remarked but after all “the Elizabethan dramatist who makes least use of law 
for metaphor and illustration is the only one who practised as a barrister, John 
Ford, of the Middle Temple.”
39
 The Bard was not one of us.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Also see John Sutherland, Henry V, War Criminal?, in Henry V, War Criminal? & 
Other Shakespeare Puzzles 108-116 (John Sutherland and Cedric Watts eds., 2000); 
Ian Ward, Law, Literature and the Child, in Legal Concepts of Childhood 111-126 
(Julia Fionda ed., 2001). 
38
 Also see John R Morss, Crime Stories: Posnerian pragmatism, Rawlsian pure 
procedural justice, and the fictional problem,  9 Deakin L.Rev. 643  (2004). 
39
 H C Beeching, William Shakespeare, Player Playmaker and Poet: A Reply to Mr 
George Greenwood MP 34 (1908). 
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